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DIRECT ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: THE DUTY TO WARN
AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
Jack E. Karns°

INTRODUCTION
The most recent development in pharmaceutical marketing strategy, is

that of direct advertising of prescription drugs, such as the television
advertisements for Viagra and periodical ads for Propecia.1 These ads
openly encourage viewers to consult their physicians about prescribing

a particular drug.2

One manufacturer has gone so far as to use

celebrities in the direct advertising of a particular drug.3 This new
*Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, SIJD.
(Candidate) (Health Law and Policy), Loyola University Chicago, 2000; LL.M. (TaWation).
Georgetown University, 1992; J.D., Tulane University, 1981; M.P.A., M.S., 1974, B A.. 1973.
Syracuse University
'Bob Van Voris, DrugAds Could Spell Legal Trouble, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1997, at B1.
("[L]awyers on both sides of the issue agree that plaintiffs will use the ads to assault the
learned intermediary defense"). See EsQumE, October 1999, at 60-61 (Merek Pharmaceutical
advertisement for Propecia- hair loss for men).
2
Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999) [hereinafter Per? 11]
(quoting an example of direct advertising the Claritin advertisement: "[a] kind voice instructs
to 'see your doctor about Claritin").
the viewer
3
Viagra is just one of many prescription drugs that are now actively advertised through
various media outlets. However, Viagra may presently have the most ,ell-known celebrity
spokesperson, former Senator Robert Dole. Other recently Food and Drug Administration
(hereinafter FDA) approved drugs receiving much attention are Nolvadex (breast ancer),
Glucophage (diabetes), Celebrex (arthritis) and Paxil (social anxiety). Drug manufacturers
even advertise prescription arthritis medicine, Rimadyl, for dogs. The foregoing prescription
ads can be found in PEOPLE WEEKLY, Oct. 4, 1999, at 43-44 (Rimadyl), 54-57 (3ol~ade'?, 8384 (Glucophage), 98-100 (Celebrex) and 128-130 (Paxil). Another recently FDA approved
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direct advertising approach has generated a direct tort action assault on
pharmaceutical companies. 4 Litigation in this area has focused on
warnings that are included in media advertisements and prescription
packaging purchased by the consumer.'
One of the important issues related to direct advertising litigation
is the effect this marketing approach will have on the established
Learned Intermediary Rule (LIR or the Rule).' The Rule dictates that a
manufacturer of a pharmaceutical fulfills its duty to warn about
ultimate or possible side effects of a drug if the manufacturer provides
accurate drug infonnation to the prescribing physician.7 The physician
then has a duty to relay all pertinent facts about the drug to the patient.
Notwithstanding this well-established rule, plaintiffs claim that
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations do not preempt state
tort law.9 Plaintiffs have argued state tort claims, which expand a
manufacturer's duty to warn, when suing manufacturers.' Often, the
application of state tort law creates a higher standard to which the
manufacturer would be held." Some courts have found that FDA
regulations do not preempt state tort law. 2 In addition, plaintiffs are
now claiming that the LIR should not apply when pharmaceutical
manufacturers take their product directly to the consuming public rather3
than relying on a health care practitioner to provide the information.'
drug receiving much attention is Xenical. This medication is aimed at overweight individuals
and curbs a person's appetite in order to lose weight. See PatientInformation About XENICAL
Capsules (revised May 1999) <http://vww.rocheusa.comlproducts/xenical/ppi.html>.
4

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Lit., 165 F.3d 374, 377, 379 (5th Cir.

1999) [hereinafter In re Norplant].

'See id.
6

See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 376. See generally Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308,
1311-12 (N.Y. 1993) (describing the issue on appeal as the "nature and extent of prescription
drug manufacturer's obligation to make known the potential hazards of its products"); Perez
11, 734 A.2d at 1252 ("[the] utilization of direct consumer marketing raises questions and
issues addressing manufacturer liability").
7
See Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 300 (Okla. 1997).
8
See id.
9
See id. at 301-02.

'OSee id. at 300.
1"See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 376.
12
See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 302-03.
3
See In Re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 377.
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Plaintiffs argue that, by voluntarily and openly choosing to take their
product directly to consumers, the manufacturers obviate the protection
provided by the LIR.4 Notably, these are two separate issues that
plaintiffs are questioning. First, the preemption of FDA regulations
involves whether the manufacturer's warnings were adequate under the
federal and state laws. 5 Second, the issue of whether the LIR applies
only relates to the question of to "whom the manufacturer warned," not
6
whether the warning was adequate.'
The purpose of this article is to address the current case law related
to both of these issues. The article will review the LIR as it existed
prior to the onslaught of direct pharmaceutical advertising and to make
some observations concerning the Rule in light of current litigation. 7
Some observations will be made suggesting when pharmaceutical
companies directly advertise their product to the consumer they have
more to lose than to gain by virtue of circumvention of the LIR.
BACKGROUND
As previously stated, the LIR dictates that any prescription drug
manufacturer will have discharged its duty to warn the patient-user
about the side effects of a drug simply by supplying physicians with
accurate information about these hazards. 8 The manufacturer is
obligated to warn of any dangers that it knew or should have knovn as
the result of exercising reasonable care.'9 Manufacturers inform
physicians in several ways, but the most common methods are
including the warnings in the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) and
the package inserts.2"
4

See id. at 377 (asserting that the LIR should not apply because Norplant vas marketed
directly to the end users).
'5See Hurley v. Lederle Lab. Div. of Am Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir

1988).
'6. at 1178.

"See Perez II, 734 A.2d at 1246-47 (describing the change in health care and
advertising of pharmaceuticals).
'8 See Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 872-73 (E.D. Mich. 1935).
19See Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1993).
20

See id at 1311.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[

(Vol. 3:273

Essentially, the Rule has provided a buffer zone for
pharmaceutical companies by interecting prescribing physicians as the
"learned intermediary."'
These "learned intermediaries" provide
information, which the manufacturer has compiled, to the patient
regarding side effects or other important information discovered as a
The prescribing
result of research and development projects.2
physician is effectively a filtering device. This ensures that consumers
obtain the opinion of an independent party-the physician-to help
determine whether the drug's side effects offset the potential gain.23
The court in Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals24 succinctly described
the physician's role as the intermediary. In Edwards, the court stated:
Where a product is available only on prescription or through
the services of a physician, the physician acts as a "learned
intermediary" between the manufacturer or seller and the
patient. It is his duty to inform himself of the qualities and
characteristics of those products which he prescribes for or
administers to or uses on his patients, and to exercise
independent judgment, taking into account his knowledge of
the patient as well as the product. The patient is expected to
and, it can be presumed, does place primary reliance upon
that judgment. The physician decides what facts should be
told to the patient.. .The doctrine extends to prescription
drugs because, unlike over the counter medications, the
patient may obtain the drug only through a physician's
prescription, and the use of prescription drugs is generally
monitored by a physician.'
The physician, based on knowledge about his or her patient, must
determine what information should be discussed with the patient.26
Once the physicians make this determination, prescriptions are
21

See Edwards, 933 F.2d at 300.
22See Martin, 628 N.E.2d at 1311-12 (discussing the contents of warnings that

manufacturers must provide physicians).
23Martin, 628 N.E.2d at 1311.
24
See Edwards, 933 F.2d at 298.
25
Edwards, 933 P-2d at 300-01.
26
Id
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scrutinized again by a pharmacist prior to filling the order.2 7 Due to the
LIR, the drug manufacturer has the attending physician (and
presumably the pharmacist) as a buffer against litigation emanating
from potential side effects of prescription drugs."
The current LIR requires drug manufacturers to provide adequate
warnings to physicians and health care providers, not to consumers
directly.29 The LIR was created when there were no advertising
campaigns directed to the consumer drug user."0 The Rule's legal
rationale is based on the premise that the critical task of balancing the
benefits and risks of prescription drugs should lie with the prescribing
physician.3 The physician's role is intended to provoke a meaningful
discussion between patient and physician prior to making any decision
to prescribe the drug. The courts have substantiated this legal rationale.
Courts have found prescribing physicians liable when the drug was
properly labeled and the prescribing physician failed to inform a patient
regarding a prescription drug's relevant side effects.3" Essentially, the
health care professional's duty to warn provides a separate protective
shield against liability for the drug manufacturer.33 However, when the
manufacturer breaches the duty to warn the physician, the manufacturer
is held directly liable to the patient, not the physician, for a breach of
duty.3 4 These tort cases have typically been framed in the context of the
LIR failure to warn language.35

27

Afartin, 628 N.E.2d at 1311-12.

2

sld at 1311.

29

See id

30

See Perez II, 734 A.2d at 1247.
3'See Martin, 628 N.E.2d at 1311.
32See id at 1310-13.
33

See Krasnopolsky v. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp 1342, 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

(discussing that a "treating physician's decision not to inform a patient of a side effect acts as
an intervening cause which shields the drug manufacturer from any possible liability under a
failure34to warn theory").
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).
3"See id
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ANALYSIS
Established Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Rule
Even before the pharmaceutical companies began to take their products
directly to the consuming public via direct advertising, courts were

presented with plaintiff arguments in favor of a variety of exceptions to
LIR.3 6 Two of these arguments were held to be valid exceptions to LIR
and have been recognized by the courts: 1) mass immunizations and 2)
FDA mandated warnings directly to the consumer, not just warnings to
the physician.37 The first exception concerns the immunization of
patients en masse." In these immunization cases, courts have held that
the health care provider is not functioning in the same learned
intermediary role as during a traditional office visit.39 The courts have
simply stated that in the immunization cases, no physician-patient
relationship is created and "the drug is not administered as a
prescription drug."4 Therefore, the role of the physician as learned
intermediary does not exist.4 The courts have held the defendant
innoculator is only liable under traditional theories of negligence and
strict liability.42
The second exception, however, has not been uniformly agreed
upon.43 Plaintiffs have argued that the LIR ought not to apply when the
36

See Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Okla. 1997); Krasnopolslky, 799
F. Supp at 1364. For application of the "failure to warn" theory in other industries, see
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek Am. Arms, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (handguns); Fane
v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1991) (medical devices).
"See Edwards, 933 F.2d at 301.
38
See Allison v. Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948, 959 (Nev. 1994); Cunningham v,
Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1975); Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d
1352, 1358 (8th Cir. 1986); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab, 498 F.2d 1264, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1974).
39See Edwards, 933 F.2d at 301.
40

1d.

41

1d. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass. 1985) (stating
that the LIR applies only when the "manufacturer's reliance on the intermediary Is
reasonable").
42
See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1269-70.
43
See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301. Some courts have refused to adopt this exception to
LIR. See Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 680 F. Supp 1293, 1305 (D. Minn. 1988); Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp
546, 546 (D. Conn. 1978).
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FDA mandates that pharmaceutical manufacturers provide -warnings to
the consumer directly about prescription drugs and their side effects 4
The FDA has an important role in the distribution of prescription drugs.
The FDA's labeling authority consist of providing pre-market approval
of all drugs, including any language which must appear on the drug
package label, on the drug label, or on any package insert.!
The standard information contained on the label includes product
description, usage and dosage information, and any clinical
pharmacology results.46 The FDA labeling regulation requires only that
the label include warnings regarding serious adverse consequences of
the drug's consumption, including any potential safety hazards! 7 This
includes specific language regarding pregnancy complications that may
result from usage of the drug.4 S These side effects are based on
scientific data.49 The results of informal data collected through nonstandardized research methods, which provides, at the very least,
anecdotal evidence, are not required to be disclosed unless it can be
demonstrated that the data is clinically relevant."0 In addition, warning
labels and inserts must be amended or revised "as soon as there is
reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a
drug."' Manufacturers have an ongoing disclosure duty to the FDA
with regard to any adverse drug incidents resulting from patient use. 2
The FDA has the authority to mandate that the manufacturers directly
warn consumers.5 3 Plaintiffs have argued that an exception to the LIR

4See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301, McKee v. Moore, 64S P.2d 21, 25 (O-la. 19s2);
Spychala v. G.D. Searle Co., 705 F. Supp 1024, 1033 (D.N.J. 1988); Lukasnzewiez v. Ortho
Pharm.4 Corp., 510 F. Supp 961, 965 (E.D. Wis. 19S1).
SSee 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994).
4621 C.F.R. § 201.57. (1999).
47

k1a

48,

4921 C.F.R. § 201.57 (1999).

5021 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1999).
51.
'221

C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(4) (1999).

"321 CYFR § 201.57(f)(2) (1999).
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exists in situations where the FDA asserts this authority and requires
the manufacturer to warn the consumers directly. 4
In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation," an
argument for an exception to the LIR predicated on the FDA's
mandated warning to consumers was met with some success. 6 The
court noted that the prescription drug, the birth control pill, was subject
to extensive regulation." In fact, the FDA required the manufacturers
to warn the consumer directly. The court recognized the following:
The FDA has promulgated regulations designed to ensure
that the choice of "the pill" as a contraceptive method is
informed by comprehensible warnings of potential side
effects... "users of these drugs should, without exception, be
furnished with written information telling them of the drug's
benefits and risks"... [I]n the absence of direct written
warnings, many potential users of "the pill" do not receive
the needed information "in an organized, comprehensive,
58
understandable, and handy-for-future-reference form."
(emphasis added)
In MacDonald,the court recognized that, due to several factors specific
to "the pill,"59 this type of prescription stood apart from other
prescription drugs." The Court held that a manufacturer of an oral
contraceptive has an affirmative duty to warn users of possible side
effects. 6

54

See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301; McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 25 (Okla, 1982);
Spychala v. G.D. Searle Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1033 (D.N.J. 1988); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 965 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
5
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
56
See id. at 70.
"7See id. at 69.
5
See id. at 69-70.
59
See id. at 70 (listing the specific factors).
6
475 N.E.2d at 70.
OMacDonald,
6
'See id. (holding that "the manufacturer of oral contraceptives is not justified in relying
on warnings to the medical profession to satisfy its common law duty to warn, and the
manufacturer's obligation encompasses a duty to warn the ultimate user").
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This exception has not been limited to cases involing
contraceptives.62 The court in Edwards held that an exception to LIR
existed for the prescription of nicotine patches, barring the use of the
physician as a shield from liability.63 The courted stated:
When direct warnings to the user of a prescription drug have
been mandated by a safety regulation promulgated for the
protection of the user, an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine exists, and failure on the part of the
manufacturer to warn the consumer can render the drug
64
unreasonably dangerous.
The holdings in MacDonald and Edwards, however, have not been
widely followed.6"
Not all courts have accepted the plaintiffs'
arguments that the FDA mandated warnings create an exception to the
LIR.
However, if the LIR exception is created this begs the question
whether "the manufacturer has fulfilled its legal obligation once the
warnings are approved by the FDA and transmitted to the user" when
the LIR does not apply. 6
The courts have come to different
conclusions when determining whether regulations issued by the FDA,
pursuant to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),' 7 preempt the
plaintiff's common law failure to warn claims." Manufacturers argue
that once they have complied with FDA requirements, the duty to warn

62

See Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997) (discussing that there is
no reason not to extend this exception to nicotine patches available by prescription 1.
63
See id at 303.
641L at 301.
65
See Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 400-01 (Dal. 1939); Kociemba v. GD,
Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp 1293, 1305 (D. Minn. 1988); Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471
F. Supp 546, 547-48 (D. Conn. 1978).
66
Edwards, 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997).
67
See Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (D.N.J. 1933).
6SSee Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301-02 (discussing Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 51W US. 470
(1996) the court noted the adequacy of warnings is a question of state law and Spychala v.
G.D. Serale & Co., 705 F.Supp at 1024, holding "compliance with FDA requirements is
sufficient to bring a case back within the learned intermediary rule").
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is fulfilled.6 9 However, plaintiffs propose that even though the
manufacturer has conformed to FDA requirements, state law may still
impose a stricter duty to warn on the manufacturer.7" In MacDonaldv.
Ortho PharmaceuticalCorporation,the court held that even though
FDA standards were met, the manufacturer's duty to warn and to
comply with state law were not absolved." In addition, the court in
Edwards upheld the plaintiffs argument to expand the manufacturer's
duty, stating:
[T]he common law duty to warn is controlled by state
law .... Although the common law duty we today recognize is
to a large degree coextensive with the regulatory duties
imposed by the FDA, we are persuaded that, in instances
where a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that a
manufacturer's compliance with FDA labeling requirements
or guidelines did not adequately apprise [prescription drug]
users of inherent risks, the manufacturer should not be
shielded from liability by such compliance.72
3
Hurley v. Lederle LaboratoriesDivision of American Cyanamid7
also dealt with the issue of FDA labeling requirements versus the
conflict with state law failure to warn claims. 4 In Hurley, the Fifth
Circuit stated that there may be a preemption issue; however, the
holding has not been adopted by other jurisdictions.75 Even though the
decision has not been widely adopted,76 the advent of direct advertising
of prescription drugs may force another look at Hurley. In the Hurley
case, the plaintiffs alleged that their child suffered extreme neurological

69

See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 299.
See id. at 301.
71See McDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. 1985); Spychala v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F.Supp. at 1033; Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A2d 398, 401-02
(Del. 1989).
72Edwards, 933 P.2d at 302-03.
73See Hurley v. Lederle Lab. Div. of Am. Cyanamid, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
745See id. at 1176.
7 See id. at 1175-77.
76See id.
70
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injuries as a result of a particular vaccine." Plaintiffs argued that the
vaccine was unreasonably dangerous because there was an alternative
vaccine that did not pose a comparable risk." Plaintiffs also contended
that the defendant did not provide adequate warnings." The district
court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the drug
manufacturer reasoning that federal laws preempt any state law claims
pursuant to the federal scheme to encourage vaccination." However,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding, rejecting the
defendant's argument that the statutes were sufficient to implicitly
preempt all state product liability claims.8
The Fifth Circuit
recognized "FDA regulation does not generally preempt stricter state
law standards for medical products. 8 2
The Hurley court made clear that the failure of the FDA to approve
an alternative vaccine did not prevent the trial court from concluding
that the vaccine used was unreasonably dangerous." However, the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' state law claims for failure to warn
were potentially at odds with FDA regulations, and were, therefore,
preempted.' The court expressed that any common law duty requiring
a pharmaceutical manufacturer to provide warnings that were at
variance with those established by the FDA created a potential conflict
with the FDA's requirements. 5 The court explained:
[T]hey [the manufacturers] argue that state law would
impermissibly conflict with federal law if it required a
warning different from that approved and required by the
FDA.. .In the area of approving warnings, although the FDA
77See Hurley,863 F.2d at 1175.
78

See id.

79

See idLat 1175-77.

SoSee idL at 1175 (discussing that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21
U.S.C. § 301 (1994), and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247(b). 262
preempt state law claims).
SSee Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1176 (noting that the majority of courts have ruled a3ainst
preemption).
S2See idat 1177.
3
See idL at 1179.

mSee
id
5

" See ide

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:273

takes an active role in designing the warning, it remains a
partially passive agency. That is, it accepts information
given by manufacturers proposing the licensing of a
particular vaccine, and determines a proper warning based
upon the information provided. A state law determination on
this issue should not be interjected to overrule the decision of
Such a procedure would place vaccine
the FDA.
manufacturers in a position where they could not comply
with both obligations.. .It would be patently inconsistent for a
state then to hold the manufacturer liable for including that
precise warning when the manufacturer would otherwise be
liable for not including it. Thus, assuming that the FDA has
processed all the relevant and available information in
arriving at the prescribed warning, its decision as to the
6
proper wording must preempt by implication that of a state.8
Thus, the court left open the possibility of liability being imposed upon
a manufacturer for failure to warn if it fails to provide the FDA with
relevant information necessary for the development of an adequate
consumer warning." The FDA depends primarily upon manufacturers
to provide safety information that is used in formulating label
requirements and other information published on package inserts. 9
Other courts have rejected the Hurley decision and have held that FDA
labeling requirements do not preempt state failure to warn claims."
This issue is of particular importance to plaintiffs looking to state
failure to warn claims rather than relying on federal law.9" Due to the
direct advertising campaign of these prescription pharmaceuticals, the
issue has been revived. The state failure to warn claims will certainly
be utilized as an argument for plaintiffs who have claims related to
direct marketing of prescription drugs. Plaintiffs will claim that federal
preemption does not require that a litigant forgo his or her right to
86

See Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1179.

87

See id.
See id. at 1179-80.
89
See In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F.Supp. 543, 544 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
8

90

0ne of the primary reasons for individuals looking to take their claims to state court

rather than federal court is the limitation within the ERISA statute that limits damages to the
amount of the procedure that was denied as opposed to wrongful death claims.
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litigate appropriate claims in state court. The manner in which Hurley
may be interpreted by subsequent court cases will be most critical with
regard to resolving the federal preemption question. It can fairly be
stated that the pharmaceutical companies will look for dicta within
Hurley that may support a holding that they are regulated by the FDA
rather than state statutes dealing with the failure to warn issue.
Direct Advertising as a New Exception to the LIR
Another argument that plaintiffs are likely to advance is that an
exception to LIR is created when the manufacturer advertises directly
to the public.9 Plaintiffs have already made this claim, arguing that if
the physician prescribes an elective prescription drug which has been
advertised to the consumer directly, the LIR no longer applies.' This
exception to the LIR mandates a change in the warning standard.
Warnings must be pitched toward the reasonably prudent patientconsumer rather than the prescribing physician.9"
Proponents of this position argue that those drugs receiving the
most exposure in direct advertising, particularly those on television and
print media, 94 are drugs that are not necessarily designed to cure or
mitigate a serious physical ailment or disease. s In fact, these are
elective drugs, most likely prescribed for either cosmetic or non-life
threatening health situations?6 Plaintiffs argue the should not apply in
the standard fashion so as to provide a protective barrier for the
manufacturer. 97 Rather, the prescribing physician is merely acceding to
a request from the patient that is deemed both elective and medicinally
non-interventionist, not to mention cultivated as the result of the drug
manufacturer's direct advertising effort." Enforcing the duty of a
prescribing physician to warn under these circumstances, then, would
go further than that which a reasonably prudent health care provider is
91

See Perez II, 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999)

92

See id
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 63 (Mass. 1935).
'See id
"'See id at 71.
)SSee id
97
See id
93
See MacDonald,475 N.E.2d at 69.
93
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obligated to inform pursuant to current law. Currently, the plaintiffs
who have advanced this argument have received differing judgments
from the courts.9 9
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,Inc.,"' plaintiffs argued that the
direct advertising of the prescription drug put the drug manufacturer
beyond the protection of the LIR."' The plaintiffs argument was
based on a footnote in Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc."2 This footnote
stated:
[i]n an appropriate case, the advertising of a prescription drug
to the consuming public may constitute a third exception to
the learned intermediary rule. By advertising directly to the
consuming public, the manufacturer bypasses the traditional
patient-physician relationship, thus lessening the role of the
03
"learned intermediary."'
The New Jersey Superior Court was not persuaded by the direct
advertising argument. 4 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's decision. 5
On appeal, the court noted that the manufacturer began a massive
direct advertising campaign in 1991, which lacked information about
the drug's side effects.0 6 The court discussed the four theoretical bases
for the LIR and determined that at least three of these are absent in the
direct advertising context.'0 7
The court concluded that direct
99See Perez 11, 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999) (holding that that the "learned

intermediary" doctrine does not apply to direct marketing of prescription drugs to consumers);
In re Norplant, 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Texas' intermediary doctrine
precluded manufacturers' liability).
1°°See Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 713 A.2d 588 (N.J. Super. 1997) rev'd, Perez I1,
734
A.2d at 1251.
10'Id. at 593.

02
1

See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F.Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1991) rev'd, Garside v,
Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 1992).
103Id. at 211 n.4.

'°4See Perez, 713 A.2d at 593-94.
'05See Perez II, 734 A.2d at 1264
'06See id. at 1248.
'07See id. at 1255.
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advertising of pharmaceuticals "belies each of the premises on which
the learned intermediary doctrine rests."'0 2 In addition, the Perez
opinion recognized that many elective drugs cause substantial side
effects, making consumer protection extremely important because these
pharmaceuticals are not medically necessary." 9 The court found that as
a result of direct advertising patients now enter their physician's office
with preconceived expectations about their treatment."' Based on the
foregoing, the court held that the LIR would not apply when a
manufacturer misleads or deceives the consumer in direct advertising."'
Justice Pollock's dissenting opinion in Perez rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments that a new LIR exception be created."' The
dissent explained that the LIR is implemented not because the
manufacturer directly markets to the physician, but because the
physician is in a position to make an individualized evaluation of the
drug's risks. "' 3 This allows the physician to warn each patient based on
the individual's health status." 4 In addition, the patient is unable to
obtain the drug absent a physician's prescription."'
The dissent
explained that direct advertising should not affect the application of the
LIR." 6 Similarly, the court in In re Norplant Contraceptivesfound that
direct marketing of Norplant to the consumers did not create an
exception to the LIR."7 The court noted that regardless of direct
advertising, a physician continues to have the responsibility of
weighing the risks and benefits before prescribing an elective drug.'
Notwithstanding these dissenting views, plaintiffs could argue
that, as long as the physician determines that the patient is sufficiently
healthy and does not exhibit any signs that the side effects are likely to
'O'la at 1256.
""9See ia at 1257.
"0 See Perez If, 734 A.2d at 1260.
"'See id at 1264.
" 2See ia at 1268-69 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
"3See id at 1266.
" 4See id

"'See Perez H, 734 A.2d at 1266.
" 6See id. at 1268.
"7 See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999)
"Ssee id.
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occur in the individual, judicial prudence dictates that the prescribing
physician not be held to the learned intermediary standard." 9 For
elective prescriptions, ultimately the patient is making this decision
whether to take the drug. Absent any obvious or known physical
conditions of which the physician is aware, the patient is most likely to
get what he or she wants.12 1 The consumer may try to talk the
prescribing physician into writing the prescription without a sufficient
physical examination to meet the Rule's standard.'
If a physician
declines to prescribe the elective drug the zealous patient can always
shop for a physician willing to write the requested prescription, and the
issue as to whether an exception to the Rule should be developed in
these cases will remain unanswered. Any patient who is ultimately
successful in the pursuit of a prescription for a particular elective drug
is not likely to resort to the courts to resolve the question of whether an
individual has a right to be his or her own prescribing physician in
elective drug cases.
However, defendants argue that it is not possible to mitigate or
reduce a physician's legal duty of care with regard to exercising
professional judgment in prescribing elective drugs.2 2 The power of
the media, the influence of the advertisement and the ultimate impact
on the prospective patient make it necessary for a prescribing physician
to exercise some type of filter or buffer role. 2 3 The cases upholding the
two types of established exceptions to the LIR exemplify that, in some
situations, it is practical and necessary to expand the manufacturer's
duty to warn.2 4 As courts begin to face challenges stemming from
direct advertising suits, it is possible that another widely acknowledged
exception will be created.

"9 See id.
120See Perez II, 734 A.2d at 1260 (Physicians complain that it is impossible to compete
with pharmaceutical companies' massive advertising budgets, and resign themselves to the fact
that if consumers
make enough noise, they will eventually relent to patient pressure).
2
1 'See id. at 1260 (discussing that physicians may relent to patient pressure).
122See id.
'2See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek Am Arms Inc., 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
124See In re Norplant, 955 F. Supp. 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999).
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IMPACT OF DIRECT ADVERTISING
The movement toward direct advertising of prescription drugs has been
swift and all encompassing."2 As a consumer oriented society that relies
on the capitalist system of commerce, the direct advertising of
pharmaceuticals presents interesting and unusual problems. One aspect
of drug advertisements that may elude consumers' notice is the length of
fine print or verbiage detailing the conditions of ingestion and possible
side effects. Clearly these drug advertisements are careful to take steps to
protect "consumer choice," but do so through "dilut[ion]" 6 of the risks
relative to the drug's benefits. Drug companies punctuate every
27
advertising effort by directing the consumer to "ask your doctor."'
Such direction hurls liability back into the lap of the prescribing
physician. In essence, having articulated its duty to warn of potential side
effects directly to the consumers, drug companies expect to rely on the
LIR to escape product liability. The question in emerging caselaw will
be whether or not courts will allow drug companies to have it both ways.
These new developments in direct advertising of pharmaceutical
companies coincide with the adoption of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUcT LIABILrry (1997), which adopted a "tepid
endorsement" of the LIP,S In essence, the American Law Institute
recognized that the LIR is inappropriate in situations vhere a physician
assumes a "much-diminished role as an evaluator or decisionmaker."''
While some sought to solidify an exception to the LIR doctrine explicitly
in instances of direct advertising of pharmaceutical companies in the
RESTATEMENT, the issue was ultimately left to "developing case law. ' -"
Indeed, developing caselaw has acknowledged that "direct advertising of
drugs to consumers alters the calculus of the learned intermediary
doctrine"'' such that pharmaceutical companies may not rely on the LIR
'2SSee

Perez11, 734 A.2d at 1252.

26

See id

' 27See id at 1252-53.
1
"2See id at 1253 (citing Charles J.Walsh, The Learned Intermcdiary Do.Irnc: Th
2
CorrectPrescriptionfor DrugLabeling, 4S RUTGERS. REV. 821, 869 (1994)),
'290See id at 1253 (citing RESTATaMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODu rLLnIvLrT- (1997)).

13See Perez11, 734 A.2d at 1253.
131See id at 1254.
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in direct-advertising cases. As sales of Viagra soar to $788 million
secondary to celebrity endorsements and clever ads, 132 pharmaceutical
companies may be forced to re-think their marketing strategy once
product liability claims begin to offset these profits.
Ultimately, in response to developing caselaw, the Restatement may
officially adopt an exception to the LIR, leaving pharmaceutical
companies completely vulnerable to product liability claims. "Patient
choice is an increasingly important part of our medical-legal
jurisprudence.' ' 33 However, by "encroaching"' 34 on the patient-physician
relationship with consumer-directed advertising, pharmaceutical
companies may find themselves saddled with the liability that goes along
with it.
CONCLUSION
The LIR has traditionally shielded drug manufacturers from liability as
long as the manufacturer has fulfilled its duty to warn by providing
physicians with all the side effects of the drug. 35 However, the courts
have established two exceptions to the LIR. 36 With the increase in
direct advertising, the pharmaceutical companies have created the
potential of a valid new LIR exception. As a result of direct
advertising, it is likely that many more lawsuits will be filed. For
instance, Viagra lawsuits will most likely ensue and will determine
whether or not the manufacturer, Pfizer Company, is shielded by
physician's due to the LIR. One of the issues certainly to be debated
heavily with regard to Viagra is the fact that Pfizer has chosen to
initiate an extremely vigorous and long-term direct advertising
campaign. 37 Pfizer does not always make clear in its advertisements
that Viagra is an optional drug for the consuming public.131 Perhaps the
132See id. at 1252.
133 See id. at 1257.
134 See id. at 1256.
135See Odgers v. Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp 867, 872-73 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
136
See supra,pp. 241-51.
137See supra,note 3.
138The term "optional drug" refers to a medication typically sought by patients on an
elective basis for non-life threatening situations. Referral to "vanity" treatments is more
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absence of these warnings was intended to be the basis for invoking the
LIR, since the ad's spokesperson always suggests that a physician be
consulted. This advertising tactic, however, may not succeed as courts
have begun to hold that direct advertising can serve as an exception to
139
the LR.

pejorative, but the term confers the essential view that the described treatment is one of
personal choice, ostensibly in conjunction with the advice and consent of a physician. In
current advertising, drug costs are not considered relevant to the purchase choice. The
advertisements give the impression that any patient who wants the prescription drug can afford
it. The primary difficulty raised by this Article is whether optional choices made by the patient
displace the traditional protections afforded health care providers by the Learned Intermediary
Rule.
' 39See Perez II, 734 A.2d 1245, 1263-64 (N.J. 1999).
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